This is a paper review for: Alemzadeh, Homa, et al. "Targeted attacks on teleoperated surgical robots: Dynamic model-based detection and mitigation." 2016 46th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). IEEE, 2016.
The authors presented cyber physical attacks on surgical robots. They used Raven 2 as a prototype which is an open-source platform for robotic surgery that has control and safety mechanisms used in the best surgical systems. The attacks take advantage of exposures of the robot’s control system during surgery. The attacks involve injecting control commands that can cause sudden movements that can injure the patient or even put the system a halt state during a surgery. The authors used a model-based analysis framework to assess the after-effects of control commands and know whether these commands are malicious or not. They used real-time computation to assess the robot’s movements. They showed that their framework can identify and mitigate malicious commands with a high accuracy.
I understood from this paper that the effects of the malicious attacks on surgical robots can be unnoticed by the operator. I think one of the topics that deserves exploring are attacks that go unnoticed until very late. By “unnoticed”, I do not only mean attacks that cause robots to misbehave by a few millimetres. I also mean attacks that involve causing a robot to misbehave infrequently (every know and them). An example can be attacks performed on factory robots where robots misbehave infrequently and only a small fraction of the products made goes corrupt to the market. This type of stealthy attacks helps the attackers be unidentified until too late in the process.